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1. Introduction 
If household behavior were motivated by economic self-interest only, voluntary contributions to 
public goods would be negligible. However, in real life, seemingly unselfish behavior is frequently 
observed and the extent of such non-economically motivated activities may be both time-consuming 
and costly. One example is Norwegian households' recycling activities. In Norway, household 
recycling is mainly voluntary with few economic incentives. During the late nineties, several 
municipalities started recycling programs for their inhabitants. Recycling bins for paper, organic waste 
etc. was placed at the curb and recycling containers for glass, metal, clothes, etc. were placed at public 
locations. The inhabitants may use these facilities free of costs with no official sanction possibilities 
for respondents who do not want to recycle. The programs vary in extension between municipalities, 
both with respect to the number of materials included and the collecting facilities (curbside, local or 
central drop-off stations for recycled materials). In 1998, half of the municipalities offered volume-
based pricing linked to the remaining waste. Unfortunately, we do not know how much the fees differ, 
nor do we know how many households that use differentiated fees (Statistics Norway, 2001). Since the 
system was new in 1999, which is the year analyzed here, we have reason to believe that the number 
of households making use of the scheme with differentiated fees was low. Despite this, Norwegian 
households took on a considerable effort sorting, folding, washing, carrying and transporting sorted 
waste. Thus, the main motivations for household recycling efforts were presumably non-economic.  
The share of total waste recycled by households in 1998 was 50 percent for paper and cardboard, 62 
percent for glass, 3 percent for plastic and 43 percent for metal (Statistics Norway, 2001, table G10). 
  
So, why do households recycle when it is voluntary, the economic incentives are few and 
governmental sanctions are limited? Several hypotheses explaining the occurrence of seemingly non-
selfish behavior have emerged in the psychological literature (se e.g. Andreoni, 1990, Rabin, 1998, 
Frey, 1994, Blamey, 1998, Deci and Ryan, 1985, Festinger, 1957, Schwartz, 1970). The literature 
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often distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsically motivated behavior is 
mainly founded on the individual's view of his/her own worth and self-respect. Examples of 
intrinsically motivated behavior may be moral norms in the form of a rule of conduct, like the golden 
rule, or altruistic preferences. The pleasure of giving, also referred to as "warm-glow", is another 
hypothesis for intrinsically motivated behavior (see e.g. Andreoni, 1990). The argument is that of 
impure altruistic preferences, as individuals gain utility from contributing to a just cause. The 
existence of social norms give rise to extrinsically motivated behavior, as individuals may recycle to 
keep up appearance and gain respect in the community, or to express their attitude towards 
environmental issues (Blamey, 1998). Extrinsic motivations may also come in the form of economic 
incentives provided by the government to promote household recycling activities, e.g. through the 
price mechanism or making recycling mandatory. The problem with introducing economic incentives 
is that they may crowd-out the intrinsic motivation, as they may reduce self-image (Brekke et al., 
2003) and/or raise questions of income distribution and fairness (Frey, 1997). Another explanation for 
seemingly unselfish behavior is that consumers may have multiple preferences, both concerning 
private welfare and the welfare of the community (Margolis, 1982, Nyborg, 2000, Sen, 1977). Much 
of the literature on norms is theoretical, but some empirical studies have been made based on real life 
data or on experiments (Blamey, 1998, Tögersen 1994, Davis and Holt, 1993, Roth et al., 1991, 
Eisenberger and Cameron, 1996, Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 1985).  
  
The main focus in the empirical literature on household recycling is how various recycling programs 
and differentiated tariffs affect household recycling behavior (see e.g. Hong et al., 1993, Jenkins et al., 
2000, Jankus et al., 1996, Tiller et al., 1997). Some empirical studies have been made examining the 
motivation for household recycling efforts and environmental behavior (Vining et al., 1990, and 1992, 
Pardini and Katzhev, 1984, Hornik et al., 1995, Hopper and Nielsen, 1991, De Young, 1986). The 
main aim of these studies is to give advice on how to increase the voluntary recycling effort. One 
empirical study discussing the motivations for household recycling as well as the effects of economic 
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incentives is Tögersen (1994). Tögersen finds evidence of re-framing and crowding-out of moral 
norms when economic incentives are introduced in the form of differentiated garbage fees. 
  
While much of the existing empirical work is based on theoretical models of recycling as a household 
production activity, only a few studies explicitly recognize the time use and its associated cost in the 
household’s recycling decisions. Two notable exceptions are Jakus et al. (1996) and Hong et al. 
(1993). The former analyzes drop-off recycling in a rural community while the latter analyzes curbside 
recycling in a metropolitan area. Both studies infer the wage rate from income data as a measure of the 
household’s opportunity cost of time.  
 
The aim of this paper is to quantify the importance of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for 
household recycling based on warm-glow, social and moral norms, in addition to the cost of lost 
leisure. We use data from a survey conducted in 1999, asking 1162 respondents drawn from the 
Norwegian population about their recycling efforts, their motivation for recycling and their 
willingness to pay (WTP) for leaving the recycling to others. In the data, we have information about 
household recycling activities on six materials: paper, cardboard, plastic, metal, glass and organic 
waste excess of yard waste. We also have information on various household characteristics such as 
household income and work hours. Descriptive analysis of household recycling efforts based on this 
data and a discussion of the motives is given in Bruvoll et al. (2002).  
 
The main contribution of this analysis is how we model the opportunity cost of lost leisure using the 
properties of the compensating variation (CV) for reducing time spent recycling. Most studies assume 
the opportunity cost of time used recycling equals the wage rate (se e.g. Jakus et al., 1996, or Hong et 
al., 1993). Whether this is the case in real life is an empirical question, depending on the household’s 
preferences and behavior. To estimate the compensating variation (CV) for all costs and benefits of 
household recycling efforts, we use the stated willingness to pay (WTP) from both an open-ended 
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(OE-) and a discrete choice (DC-) contingent valuation (CVM) question of leaving recycling to others. 
The response to the OE- and DC-CVM questions are estimated simultaneously, modifying a method 
suggested by Kealy and Turner (1993). This estimation is used to predict the opportunity cost of time 
used recycling. We also model how social and moral norms and other intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations, in addition to the opportunity cost of time used recycling and household characteristics, 
affect household recycling behavior. This is done by estimating an ordered probit model on each of the 
six materials. 
  
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we model household recycling behavior and discuss 
how it is affected by altruistic behavior, social and moral norms, and the opportunity cost of time used 
recycling. Then we discuss how to use the households compensating variation for leaving the 
household recycling efforts to a renovation firm to predict the opportunity cost of time used recycling. 
Then, in section 3, we describe the data and discuss the econometric specification of the model. The 
results from the estimations are presented in section 4, and in section 5 some concluding remarks are 
made. Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the estimations are given in the Appendix. 
2. The model 
Household utility is likely to be influenced by social and moral norms, since how we live up to these 
norms determine our sense of self-respect and the respect we gain, or sanctions we receive, from the 
community. We assume that the household gains utility (Uh) from the consumption of a vector of 
goods ( { }Mhhh xxX ...,,1= ), leisure (lh), and the consumption of non-economic goods and services such 
as environmental quality (G), self-respect and respect in the community (Rh) and the warm-glow of 
contributing to a just cause (WGh), conditional on household characteristics ( hβ ). The household is 
also assumed to meet sanctions (Sh), mainly in the form of social sanctions from the community or 
renovation workers, if the household does not recycle sufficiently. The utility function is given by: 
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( )hhhhhhhh WGGSRlXUU β;,,,,,=         (1) 
 
Household self-esteem (Rh) is assumed to increase, whereas the sanctions (Sh) are assumed to decrease 
with the quantity of waste recycled by household h (gh). Environmental quality (G) is assumed to 
increase with the total quantity of recycling in society, defined as the sum of recycled quantity from 
household h ( hg ) and from other households ( hg− ). The warm-glow (WGh) from contributing to a just 
cause is assumed to increase with the quantity of waste recycled by the household. Finally, we assume 
that the time spent recycling (eh) increases with recycled quantity. We have: 
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2.1 The household’s optimization problem 
In this model, we assume that household recycling is a short-term decision whereas the labor-supply 
location choice is viewed as a more long-term decision. This means that the labor supply is given in 
the short term, which has several implications. Fist, since the working hours are given, household 
income (Yh) is given. We assume that the household uses all money income on consumption of goods: 
∑
=
=
M
i
ihih xpY
1
, where pi is the price on good i. Second, the total numbers of hours that can be used at 
leisure or in household production (LTh) will also be given (equal to the number of waken hours excess 
of working hours). This time is allocated between recycling (eh) and other household production or 
leisure activities, hereafter referred to as excess leisure time ( hl ): hhh elLT += . So, conditional on the 
labor supply, we analyze how leisure is divided between time spent on recycling and excess leisure.  
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The household is assumed to maximize utility with respect to the consumption of all goods (Xh), 
excess leisure time (lh) and recycled quantity (gh), subject to the time and money budget. This 
maximization problem gives rise to the following Lagrange function: 
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where hη  is the Lagrange multiplier for the money budget and hξ  is the Lagrange multiplier for the 
time budget. This optimization problem gives the following first order conditions: 
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When considering excess leisure time, the household evaluates the utility effects of increased lh for a 
given time budget. When deciding on consumption of good i, the household evaluate the direct utility 
effects against the cost of increased consumption for a given money budget. Finally, when deciding on 
recycled quantity, the household evaluates the utility effects of increased respect, feeling of warm-
glow, increase in environmental quality and reduced sanctions for a given time budget. Thus, the 
Lagrange multiplier for the time budget ( hξ ) equals the utility effects of increased recycling per time 
unit and may thus be interpreted as the opportunity cost of time used on recycling. From these first 
order conditions we see that in optimum, the utility of a marginal increased excess leisure time must 
equal the utility effects of a marginal increase in time used recycling. 
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Solving all first order conditions of this maximization problem except one, using that both the time 
and money budget must be fulfilled in optimum, gives household recycling activities, excess leisure 
time and consumption of goods as a function of all prices (P), household income (Yh), total leisure 
time (LTh), recycling by other households ( hg− ) and the opportunity cost of time used recycling ( hξ ), 
conditional on household characteristics ( hβ ). 
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The opportunity cost of time spent recycling in optimum ( *hξ ) is found by solving all first order 
conditions with respect to the Lagrange multiplier for the time budget. This gives the opportunity cost 
of time as a function of all prices, household income, total time spent at leisure, and recycling by other 
households, conditional on household characteristics: 
 
( )hhhhhh gLTYP βξξ ;,,,* −=          (6) 
 
Inserting the opportunity cost of time in optimum into equation (5) gives the optimal recycling of 
waste, excess leisure time and consumption of goods for the household: ( )hhhhhh gLTYPgg β;,,,* −= , 
( )hhhhhh gLTYPLl β;,,,* −= , and ( )hhhhihih gLTYPxx β;,,,* −= . Inserting this into the utility function in 
(1), gives the household’s indirect utility as a function of all prices, household income and optimal 
recycling, conditional on household characteristics: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )hhhhhhhhhhhhh gWGgGgSgRgLTYPVV β;,,,,,,, ****−=      (7) 
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2.2 The cost of time used recycling 
The optimal recycling activity depends on all factors determining utility from recycling, such as 
respect, sanction if the household do not comply, environmental quality, warm glow of contributing 
and the opportunity cost of time spent recycling in optimum. In this paper, we want to illustrate how 
these factors affect household recycling behavior. In particular, we are interested in how the 
opportunity cost of time used on recycling affects recycling behavior. In order to find a measure for 
the individual household's opportunity costs of time, we use the household compensated variation for 
leaving recycling to others (CVh).1  
 
The household's CV is defined as the reduction in expenditures necessary to sustain utility after the 
recycling effort is left to others. Thus, the CV is the reduction in income that makes the household 
indifferent between doing the recycling themselves and leaving recycling to others. If a renovation 
firm takes over the sorting of household waste, the households gain utility since they no longer need to 
spend time recycling (eh(0) = 0) and it may use all its available leisure time as excess leisure time (lh = 
LTh). Additionally, the household does no longer feel a pressure to recycle in order to avoid sanctions, 
nor do they feel the sense of warm glow and/or self-respect from contributing to a just cause when the 
recycling is left to others (Sh(0) = Rh(0) = WGh(0) = 0). The CV for leaving household recycling to 
others may either be positive or negative depending on household preferences concerning these 
factors. For simplicity, we assume that the prices (P) are not affected by the household’s recycling 
decision, and they are thus left out of the indirect utility function. Inserting the time budget in the 
indirect utility function and using that lh = LTh when the household does not recycle (eh(0) = 0), the 
CV is defined by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0;0,,0,0,,;,,,,, ****** =−−+=∆ hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh GLTCVYVgWGgGgSgRlgeYVV ββ   (8) 
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where G  is the environmental quality generated by the total amount of waste recycled by the firm. For 
simplicity, we assume that the same amount of waste is sorted regardless of who is doing the 
recycling, the household or a renovation firm. Thus, the environmental quality is equal in the two 
situations: ( )hh ggGG −+= * . Solving this with respect to the CV gives the household compensating 
variation for leaving recycling to others as a function of household recycling in optimum, household 
income and total leisure time available, conditional on household characteristics: 
 
( )hhhhhh LTYgCVCV β;,,*=          (9) 
 
We decompose the welfare effect of leaving recycling to others ( hV∆ ) into the welfare effects of warm 
glow, reduced sanctions and self-respect ( WGRShV
,,∆ ) and the welfare effects of reduced time spent 
recycling ( ehV∆ ), that is ehWGRShh VVV ∆+∆=∆ ,, , defined by: 
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where the first utility difference equals WGRShV
,,∆  and the second difference equals ehV∆ . Using the 
intermediate-value theorem, a welfare change equals the marginal utility of income, evaluated at some 
intermediate income ( )hhhh CVYYY −∈ , , times the compensating variation: hYhh VCVV ′=∆  (see e.g. 
Johansson, 1993, equation 3.5). Using this and equation (10) we are able to decompose the total CV 
into the CV for reduced time recycling ( ehCV ) and the CV for all other factors (
WGRS
hCV
,, ), defined by: 
 
                                                     
1 For a discussion of the Compensating Variation, see Varian (1997), Mas-Colell et al (1995) or Mitchell and Carson (1989). 
 12
e
h
WGRS
h
hY
e
h
WGRS
h
h CVCVV
VV
CV +=′
∆+∆= ,,
,,
        (11) 
 
We see from equation (11) that the CV of time spent recycling equals the total CV minus the CV for 
the utility effects of warm-glow, respect and sanctions. Thus, if we assume that the household does not 
receive utility from respect, warm glow or sanction, the total CV equals the CV for time spent 
recycling since the total amount of waste recycled, and thus the environmental quality, is equal in the 
two situations. If leaving recycling to others affects utility due to warm-glow or respect from 
contributing, the total CV differ from the CV of time used recycling. In our estimations, we will use 
the property that the CV of time used recycling measures the opportunity cost of time used recycling 
( hξ ) given the households recycling effort (see equations 4 and 11). That is, we use the household's 
stated maximum willingness to pay to leave their recycling to others as a proxy for the opportunity 
cost of time used recycling. 
3. Econometric specification 
3.1 The data 
 
The data used in this analysis is part of a survey conducted by Statistics Norway in November and 
December 1999. Our sample includes 1162 respondents between the age of 16 and 79 years old drawn 
from the Norwegian population. The response rate was slightly less than 60 percent of the gross 
sample of 2000 respondents. For 76 percent of the sample, the respondent was interviewed in person 
in their own home, while the remainders of the interviews were conducted by telephone. 
 
In the survey, the respondents were asked questions whether they recycle all, most of, some or none of 
six different materials: Paper, cardboard, glass, metal, plastic and organic waste excess of yard waste. 
The answers to these questions are used to approximate the households' recycling efforts. Then, the 
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respondents were told that a waste disposal firm would take over the recycling (“Suppose that a 
recycling company can utilize your garbage. A new technology allows central source separation such 
that the environmental impact is the same. The company will collect your garbage at your home.”), 
and asked if they would be willing to make use of the offer by the waste disposal firm if it came free 
of charge (“Would you use this service if it did not cost you anything?" Or do you prefer to do your 
own recycling?”). Then, the respondents who would make use of the firm were asked two Contingent 
Valuation questions.2 First, they were asked a Dichotomous Choice Contingent Valuation (DC-CVM) 
question ("Are you willing to pay x NOK yearly to a waste disposal firm so they can take over the 
recycling effort of your household?" x = 50, 150, 250, 450, 600 NOK).3 Then, they were asked an 
Open-Ended Contingent Valuation (OE-CVM) question: ("What is the maximum yearly amount you 
are willing to pay in order for the waste disposal firm to take over your household's recycling?") 
 
In order to determine the motivation for household recycling efforts, we included questions concerning 
attitudes towards the recycling activity. The respondents were asked if they agreed, partly agreed, 
partly disagreed or disagreed to the following statements: I recycle because …. a) "I want to consider 
myself as a responsible person", b) "I want others to consider me as a responsible person", c) "I 
perceive the recycling effort as imposed by the government", d) "Recycling is a pleasant activity in 
itself", e) "I want to do what I whish others to do" and f) "I want to contribute to a better 
environment".  
 
We also asked the respondents if they thought recycling contributed to a better environment and if 
they would think of it as an advantage or a disadvantage if the municipality increased the extent of the 
voluntary recycling programs. The survey also includes routine questions concerning household in-
come and labor supply, and how densely populated the respondents place of residence is. Finally, we 
                                                     
2 See e.g. Mitchell and Carson 1989 for more information on the Contingent Valuation method. 
3 One NOK is approximately $0.12 US. 
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have information concerning the number of household members and the place of residence. (Descrip-
tive statistics of all variables included in the analysis is given in appendix table A1.) 
  
In our estimation, we will use the answers to the motivational questions as indications of how norms 
and warm-glow elements influence household recycling activities. Question a) is interpreted as an 
indication of intrinsic motivation, whereas b) is an indication of extrinsic motivation to increase the 
respect gained from recycling. If perceiving recycling as mandatory (question c) reduces household 
recycling activities, it may be an indication of crowding-out effects of intrinsic motivations. Wanting 
to contribute to the environment (question f) is interpreted a "warm-glow" effect or the desire to 
express environmental concerns through recycling. There may, however, be other reasons for wanting 
to contribute to the environment, e.g. a sense of moral or social obligation to do so. If the motivation is 
warm-glow, question (f) should indicate a benefit of household recycling. However, if it is motivated 
by a sense of commitment, it will represent an obligation to recycle. Finding recycling a pleasant 
activity (d) may be an indication of warm-glow if the reason the activity is perceived as pleasant is the 
feeling of contributing to a just cause. Wanting to do what I which others to do (question e) is 
interpreted as an indication of respondents living and acting according to the Golden Rule, which is an 
indication of moral commitment. Living according to moral norms should represent a cost of recycling 
if the aim is to avoid sanctions. On the other hand, the household may also gain utility complying with 
moral norms if it increases self-respect or the respect the household gains in the community. Agreeing 
that it would be a disadvantage if the municipality increased the extent of the voluntary recycling 
programs is an indication of social pressure to avoid sanctions. Finally, respondents who recycle 
despite a belief that it has no effect on environmental quality must have other motivations for their 
recycling activity, based on warm-glow, social and/or moral norms.  
  
In the survey, only respondents who reported to recycle at least one of the six materials were asked 
about their recycling efforts. The 7 percent of the sample who did not recycle at all are reported with 
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missing values for all questions concerning household recycling efforts and moral motivations. Thus, 
we are only able to explain the behavior of the 93 percent of the sample that engage in some kind of 
recycling activities. Furthermore, we do not have information about the type of waste collecting 
services offered by the municipalities, nor do we have information whether the municipalities offer 
volume-based tariffs or not.  
3.2 Household recycling effort 
 
We approximate the household recycling activities ( hg ) described in equation (5), by a linear function 
of household income (Yh), number of household members (Nh), cost of time used recycling (TCh), 
variables describing the household's attitude towards recycling (Dhk), plus a random error term ( hν ) 
which is assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean and a constant variance.  
 
hhh
k
khkhYhTChNh XDYTCNg νανααααα +′=+++++= ∑
=1
0
*     (12) 
 
The attitude variables are used to approximate factors concerning respect, warm-glow, sanctions and 
environmental concern. The variables included are the respondents' response to questions a) to f) (see 
the description of the data page 12), if they thought recycling contributed to a better environment and 
if they would think of it as an advantage if the municipality increased the extent of the voluntary 
recycling programs so they can recycle more.  
 
Unfortunately, we are not able to observe the household recycling of waste in volume units (g*), as we 
have only four observable outcomes: The household recycles all, most of, some or none of their 
recyclable waste. Thus, the observable recycling effort ( hg~ ) is given by: 
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where 1κ  and 2κ  are the limits where the respondents shift from recycling some to most of the waste, 
and from most to all of the waste respectively. The household recycling effort may thus be viewed as a 
latent multinomial decision model (see e.g. in Greene (1993) pp. 672 - 676).  
 
The probability of observing different levels of household recycling efforts are given by: 
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where Xα ′  follows from equation (12). Since we assume that the random error term ( hν ) is normally 
distributed, the probability of observing hg~  is given by the standard normal probability (Φ ), 
estimating all parameters in this model ( κα , ) applying an ordered Probit model. The α  parameters 
give the effects on the optimal recycling effort of marginal changes in the explanatory variables.  
3.3 The cost of time 
 
The opportunity cost of time used recycling  (TCh) in equation (12) is endogenous to the respondents, 
and must thus be instrumented in order to avoid biased estimates. This is because the covariance 
between this variable and the error term differ from zero. We estimate an instrument for the 
opportunity cost of time in optimum (described by equation 6) based the household CV for leaving 
recycling to others (se the discussion in section 2.2). We use the stated willingness to pay (WTP) from 
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both the open-ended (OE-) and discrete choice (DC-) contingent valuation (CVM) questions as a 
proxy for household CV for the service. Then, we calculate the opportunity cost of time spent 
recycling as the predicted CV excess of variables indicating benefits and moral and social costs and 
benefits of recycling.  
 
The household CV for leaving recycling to others (described by equation 9) is approximated by a 
linear function of household work hours (LSh), household gross income (Yh), the age of the head of the 
household (Ah), a set of variables indicating moral and social costs ( khMC ) and benefits (
k
hB ) from 
household recycling and a stochastic error term ( hϖ ) which is assumed to be normally distributed 
with a zero mean and a constant variance: 
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The variables indicating moral and social costs ( khMC ) are the respondents response to: "I want to 
consider myself as a responsible person", "I want others to consider me as a responsible person", "I 
perceive the recycling effort as imposed by the government", "I want to do what I whish others to do" 
and if they would think of it as a disadvantage if the municipality increased the extent of the voluntary 
recycling programs. The variables indicating the benefits ( khB ) are the respondents' response to: 
"Recycling is a pleasant activity in itself" and "I want to contribute to a better environment". The CV 
is assumed to be a function of household gross income in order to correct for the household's ability to 
meet payments. We also include the age of the head of the household, as younger families often have 
small children, increasing expenditures and the cost of additional time spent on recycling.  
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Since the respondents were asked both an open-ended and a close-ended WTP question in the 
questionnaire, we estimate the WTP from both questions simultaneously, applying a method suggested 
by Kealy and Turner (1993).4 In Kealy and Turner, the DC-CVM question was conditional on the OE-
CVM question. In our data, the conditioning is the other way around, as the OE-CVM question was 
asked after the DC-CVM question. Thus, we need to modify the method suggested by Kealy and 
Turner (1993), making the OE-CVM question conditional on the DC-CVM question.  
 
We assume that the compensated variation from the DC-CVM question (CVDC) may be written as the 
sum of the expected CV ( DCµ ) and a stochastic error term ( DCω ), where the expected CV is a linear 
function of a vector of explanatory variables (X): DCDCDC
DC XCV ωλωµ +′=+= . Likewise, the CV 
from the OE-CVM question (CVOE) is written as the sum of the expected CV ( OEµ ) and a stochastic 
error term ( OEω ): OEOEOEOE XCV ωγωµ +′=+= . These CV functions are given by equation (12). 
Furthermore, we assume that the CVDC and the CVOE are simultaneously and normally distributed: 
( ) ( )ρσσµµ ,,,,~, 22 OEDCOEDCOEDC NCVCV , where ρ  is the correlation coefficient between CVOE and 
CVDC, and 2OEσ  and 2DCσ  are the variances of CVOE and CVDC. In the DC-CVM question, the 
respondents were asked whether they were willing to pay the cost (C) for leaving the recycling to 
others or not. We define a dummy variable y that equals one if the CVDC exceeds the cost C (y = 1 if 
CVDC > C), and zero otherwise, that is, if the respondent does not accept the offer. Furthermore, we 
assume that the respondent's CV in the OE-CVM question is conditional on the answer they gave to 
the proceeding DC-CVM question. Thus, the conditional distribution of CVOE is given by:5 
( ) ( )⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+= 22 1,| ρσσ
µσρµ OE
DC
DC
OEOE
DCOE CNCVCVf .  
 
                                                     
4 See also Halvorsen and Sælensminde (1998) for a discussion of the method. 
5 See e.g. Greene (1993), pp. 72-73, for a discussion of the bivariate normal and the conditional normal distributions. 
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The simultaneous probability of observing the combined answers to the DC- and OE-CVM questions 
are given by the product of the conditional marginal probability of stating a maximum WTP equal to x 
and the probability of stating i = yes or no in the DC-CVM question: P(CVOE = x, y = i) = 
P(y=i)*P(CVOE = x | y = i). Applying the simultaneous probability of observing the combined answers 
to the CVM questions, gives the following Log-likelihood function for the simultaneous choice: 
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This Log-likelihood function is maximized applying the MINIMIZE-procedure in Limdep, estimating 
all parameters simultaneously applying a FIML-procedure.6 This estimation yield two estimates of the 
WTP, one from the OE- and one from the DC-CVM equation. We use the mean WTP from the two 
WTP-questions for each individual household as a proxy for household's opportunity cost of time in 
the ordered probit estimation of equation (12). 
 
Here, we assume the respondents statements to the two CVM questions reflects their compensated 
variation of leaving recycling to others. In the literature on the contingent valuation method, one of the 
main controversies is whether different elicitation formats under- and/or overstates the respondents 
true CV. In the theoretical literature, it is often assumed that the open-ended format gives the 
respondents incentives to overstate their true WTP (see e.g. Arrow et al., 1993, for a discussion). 
Comparative empirical analyses, on the other hand, mainly obtain higher WTP estimates using the 
DC-CVM format as compared to the OE-CVM format (see e.g. Halvorsen and Sælensminde, 1998). In 
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this analysis, we apply the responses to both questions in order to extract as much information about 
the households WTP as possible, and hopefully avoid systematical bias in the results as a consequence 
of the chosen elicitation format. 
4. Empirical results 
First in this section, we present the estimates from the simultaneous estimation on the WTP statements 
from the OE- and DC-CVM questions. Then, we present the results from the ordered Probit model on 
the share of waste recycled on six materials. 
4.1. Households' time cost 
In table 1, we present the results from the simultaneous estimations on the OE- and DC-CVM 
questions. In the estimation, household income, work hours, age of the respondent and variables 
determining the households' motivation and attitudes towards recycling were used as independent 
variables explaining the stated WTPs from both the OE- and the DC-CVM question. The attitude 
variables may take four values; disagree = 0, partly disagree = 1, partly agree = 2 and agree = 3 to the 
statements. In the first column of the table we present the estimated coefficients. In the next column, 
we present the T-value and in the last column we present the P-value. In the first section of the table, 
we present the results from the OE-CVM equation, and in the second section we present the estimates 
from the DC-CVM equation. Finally, in the last section, we present the estimated standard deviations 
and correlation coefficients.  
 
                                                     
6 See Greene (1995) for more information on the MINIMIZE procedure in Limdep.  
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Table 1: Results from the simultaneous Maximum Likelihood estimations on the willingness 
to pay for handing over household recycling efforts to others from a dichotomous 
choice- (DC-CVM) and an open-ended (OE-CVM) contingent valuation question 
Variable Coefficient T-value P-value
OE-CVM question (NOK):   
Constant 350.38 4.65 0.000
Household gross income (1000 NOK) 0.24 4.48 0.000
Work hours (hours per week) 1.50 2.34 0.019
Age of respondent (years) -7.26 -6.94 0.000
I want to contribute to the environment (0, 1, 2, 3) 21.14 0.85 0.396
I find recycling is a pleasant activity in itself (0, 1, 2, 3) -20.14 -1.83 0.068
I want to consider myself as a responsible person (0, 1, 2, 3) -0.05 0.00 0.997
I want others consider me as a responsible person (0, 1, 2, 3) 6.17 0.50 0.616
I perceive recycling as mandatory (0, 1, 2, 3) -15.42 -1.57 0.117
I which to do what I want others to do (0, 1, 2, 3) 14.40 0.92 0.356
I would think of it as a disadvantage if the municipality increased the 
extent of the voluntary recycling programs (0,1) 10.47 0.37 0.709
 
DC-CVM question (0, 1):   
Constant 491.35 3.01 0.003
Household gross income (1000 NOK) 0.30 1.90 0.057
Work hours (hours per week) 3.71 1.75 0.081
Age of respondent (years) -11.03 -3.30 0.001
I want to contribute to the environment (0, 1, 2, 3) 18.75 0.58 0.562
I find recycling is a pleasant activity in itself (0, 1, 2, 3) -17.62 -0.61 0.542
I want to consider myself as a responsible person (0, 1, 2, 3) -0.17 -0.19 0.853
I want others consider me as a responsible person (0, 1, 2, 3) 0.49 0.53 0.593
I perceive recycling as mandatory (0, 1, 2, 3) -19.93 -0.78 0.434
I which to do what I want others to do (0, 1, 2, 3) 18.57 0.63 0.529
I would think of it as a disadvantage if the municipality increased the 
extent of the voluntary recycling programs (0,1) 24.70 0.30 0.761
 
Standard deviations:   
Standard deviation from the OE-CVM question 327.06 19.56 0.000
Standard deviation from the DC-CVM question 557.75 4.93 0.000
Coefficient of correlation between the OE- Snd DC-CVM question 0.51 6.83 0.000
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Looking at the results, we see that household income increases the WTP for leaving recycling to 
others significantly, both in the OE-CVM and the DC-CVM question, as the household's capacity to 
pay increases with income. Work hours have a significant positive effect on both the OE- and DC-
CVM question, that is, households with long work hours have a higher WTP for leaving their 
recycling to others than households with more leisure time. This indicates that the cost of recycling 
increases with the work hours. This was as expected since leisure time becomes more valuable when 
the number of working hours increases. We also see that the age of the respondent have a significantly 
negative effect on the WTP-statements. There might be several reasons for this. One explanation is 
that younger families often have small children, increasing the marginal cost of time. Another 
explanation is that older people are more concerned with the moral obligation of contributing to the 
community, and that younger people are more willing to accept purchasing recycling services. 
Looking at the attitude variables, the only significant variable is finding recycling a pleasant activity, 
which reduces the WTP from the OE-CVM question. For the rest of the attitude variables, none of the 
coefficients differ significantly from zero. From the last section of the table, we see that the answers to 
the two WTP questions are not independent, as the estimated correlation coefficient ( ρ ) differs 
significantly from zero with an estimate of 0.51. Thus, assuming independence by calculating the 
WTP for each question separately will not include all information concerning the distribution of the 
WTP in the data. 
 
In order to obtain an estimate of the households' cost of time used recycling, we use this estimation to 
predict the household's mean WTP from the OE- and DC-CVM questions net of all attitude variables. 
This estimate of the households' opportunity cost of time is then applied in the estimation of the 
recycling effort on the different materials. 
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4.2. Household recycling effort 
In table 2, we present results from the ordered probit estimations on the share of the six materials 
recycled by the households. In the first column of table 2, we report the estimated coefficients in the 
ordered Probit model on the share of paper recycled by the households. In the next five columns, we 
present the coefficients from the estimated share of cardboard, plastic, metal, glass and organic waste. 
The dependent variables may take four values: Recycle none = 0, some = 1, most = 2 and all = 3 of 
the household's waste. In all estimations, the following variables were used as explanatory variables: 
household income, the estimated time costs, the number of household members, age of the respondent, 
living in a major city, living in a block of flats, variables determining the households' motivation and 
attitudes towards recycling, if they thought recycling contributed to a better environment and if they 
think it is an advantage for them if the municipality increased the extent of the voluntary recycling 
programs so they can recycle more. The attitude variables may take four values: disagree = 0, partly 
disagree = 1, partly agree = 2 and agree = 3 to the six statements (se statements a) -f) in the discussion 
of the data in section 3.1). In the last part of the table, estimates for 1κ  and 2κ  are included.  
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Table 2: Results from an ordered Probit estimation on the share of paper, cardboard, plastic, metal, glass and organic waste recycled by 
households. a  
 Paper  
Card-
board Plastic Metal Glass
Organic 
waste  
Constant 1.3526 ** 0.1321 -1.3767 ** -0.2702 -0.1333 0.2338  
Household gross income (1000 NOK) 0.0007 ** 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 ** 0.0003  
Estimated opportunity cost of time spent recycling (NOK) -0.0015 ** -0.0010 ** 0.0000 -0.0008 ** -0.0011 ** -0.0012 ** 
Number of household members (N) -0.0060  0.0557 * 0.0024 0.0150 0.0175 -0.0029  
Age of the respondent (years) -0.0007  -0.0097 ** -0.0017 0.0002 0.0044 -0.0099 ** 
Major city (0,1) 0.0047  -0.1106 -0.1361 -0.3958 ** -0.2499 ** -1.0889 ** 
Living in a block of flats (0,1) 0.1796  -0.1464 -0.2473 * -0.1495 0.1461 -0.3535 ** 
I want to consider myself as a responsible person (0, 1, 2, 3) 0.0188  0.0425 0.0297 0.1405 ** 0.0548 -0.0094  
I want others consider me as a responsible person (0, 1, 2, 3) 0.0138  0.0138 0.1038 ** 0.0390 0.0111 0.0684 * 
I perceive recycling as mandatory (0, 1, 2, 3) 0.0117  0.0015 0.1385 ** -0.0237 -0.0440 0.1734 ** 
I find recycling is a pleasant activity in it-self (0, 1, 2, 3) -0.0217  0.0958 ** 0.0981 ** 0.0960 ** 0.0452 0.0671 * 
I like to do what I want others to do (0, 1, 2, 3) 0.1256 ** 0.1579 ** 0.1022 0.0868 * 0.0706 0.0103  
I want to contribute to the environment (0, 1, 2, 3) -0.0918  0.0191 0.1097 -0.0363 0.1524 * 0.0482  
I believe recycling contributes to a better environment (0,1) 0.0194  0.2935 ** 0.1601 0.2050 * 0.4221 ** 0.1046  
I think it is an advantage if the municipality increases the extent of 
voluntary recycling programs so I can recycle more (0,1) 0.2089 ** -0.0612 -0.0934 -0.2092 ** -0.0525 -0.1833 ** 
1κ  0.2428 ** 0.3129 ** 0.2170 ** 0.3102 ** 0.2966 ** 0.1226 ** 
2κ  0.8898 ** 0.7071 ** 0.5054 ** 0.5793 ** 0.7598 ** 0.2922 ** 
a) ** implies that the coefficient differ significantly from zero with a probability of falsely rejecting the zero hypothesis at less than 5 percent. * implies that the 
coefficient differ significantly from zero with a probability of falsely rejecting the zero hypothesis at less than 10 percent. 
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Looking at the attitude variables, their importance on household recycling efforts varies between 
materials. For instance, respondents who are more concerned with self-respect, recycle more metal 
than other respondents. Respondent who are concerned with the respect they receives from others 
recycle more plastic and organic waste than others. Even if recycling is essentially voluntary in 
Norway, some respondents perceive it as mandatory. If the respondent perceives recycling as 
mandatory, it increases household recycling of plastic and organic waste significantly while the 
coefficient is insignificant for the other materials. The estimated coefficient is negative on the 
recycling of paper and glass, but these coefficients are not significant. Thus, we do not find significant 
evidence of crowding-out of intrinsically motivated behavior in our data. Respondents who find 
recycling a pleasant activity recycle significantly more of cardboard, plastic, metal and organic waste, 
and respondents agreeing to the Kantian rule recycle more of paper, cardboard and metal than other 
respondents. Wanting to contribute to a better environment only had a significantly positive effect on 
the recycling of metal. Respondents who believe that recycling contributes to a better environment 
recycle significantly more of cardboard, metal and glass than other respondents. Finally, respondents 
who think it is an advantage if the municipality increased the extent of the voluntary recycling 
programs so they can recycle more, recycle significantly more of paper and less of metal and organic 
waste than other respondents. The reason for the negative signs of the coefficient may be that these are 
respondents with a high motivation for recycling who lives in communities that do not offer recycling 
programs for marginal materials such as metal and organic waste. 
 
If we take an overall look at table 2, we see that the attitude variables have the largest impact on the 
recycling of the more marginal materials such as plastic and organic waste, and less on the recycling 
of paper and glass, where most municipalities has well-functioning recycling programs. We see that 
especially for the recycling of paper, which is the most common material for curbside recycling 
programs, only agreeing to the Kantian rule increases the effort significantly. For cardboard, enjoying 
the recycling activity in itself and the belief that recycling increases environmental quality also 
increase the effort, probably since the recycling of cardboard involve a lot of cleaning and folding of 
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milk cartons. We also see that enjoying the recycling activity in itself have a positive effect on the 
recycling effort of most waste fractions with the exception of paper and glass, where the effort of 
recycling is smallest.  
5. Concluding remarks 
Based on the findings from this study, we see that the most important variables explaining household 
recycling activities were finding recycling a pleasant activity, which may be interpreted as warm-
glow, and the estimated opportunity cost of time spent recycling. Beyond this, the importance of the 
motivations varies with the nature of recycling the various materials. Furthermore, we find that 
perceiving recycling as mandatory does not seem to crowd-out other motivations for recycling. On the 
contrary, it seems like perceiving recycling as mandatory reduces the WTP for leaving recycling to 
others, increases the recycling effort and strengthens the moral motivation. This indicates that the 
households gain utility when the local government makes recycling mandatory, which may seem odd. 
One explanation may be that governmental legislation may influence the publics' attitude towards 
recycling, increasing awareness and emphasizing the importance of recycling. Another explanation is 
that households may expect the total recycling in the community to increase, resulting in a higher 
environmental quality, when recycling is a joint effort secured by legislation where everybody 
participates. A third explanation may be a sense of moral obligation to sort waste when recycling is 
perceived as mandatory. Thus, the respondents may see the alternative of leaving recycling to others 
as slinking away from their obligations as a citizen, reducing their WTP.  
  
Market-based instruments to stimulate economic incentives are gaining popularity in the 
environmental policy. For instance, during the late nineties, most municipalities introduced various 
schemes to stimulate household recycling efforts. These mainly consisted of differentiated garbage 
fees, curbside recycling programs, and/or local and central drop-off facilities for various materials. 
The effectiveness of these incentives may depend on how they affect the motivation for household 
recycling behavior. In this study, we have not included variables describing the recycling programs 
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and differentiated garbage fees, as they were not available in our data. We have only tested if 
perceiving recycling as mandatory crowd out morally motivations for recycling, which we find no 
evidence of. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that for instance introducing differentiated 
garbage fees may crowd-out intrinsic motivation, which Thögersen (1994) find evidence of in 
Denmark. How different recycling programs stimulate the recycling of various materials is the main 
focus of our future research on this topic. 
 
 28
Appendix 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics. 
 Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum NumCases
Willing to pay the cost (0, 1) 0.36 0.48 0 1 1162
Maximum WTP for leaving recycling to others (NOK) 175.97 276.32 0 2000 1059
Recycling effort on cardboard (0, 1, 2, 3) 1.69 1.31 0 3 1162
Recycling effort on paper (0, 1, 2, 3) 2.41 1.02 0 3 1162
Recycling effort on glass (0, 1, 2, 3) 2.14 1.19 0 3 1162
Recycling effort on metal (0, 1, 2, 3) 1.33 1.35 0 3 1162
Recycling effort on plastic (0, 1, 2, 3) 0.84 1.23 0 3 1162
Recycling effort on organic waste (0, 1, 2, 3) 1.35 1.43 0 3 1162
Household gross income (1000 NOK) 392.96 254.75 0 3000 1036
Work hours (hours per week) 25.83 19.73 0 100 1162
Number of household members (N) 2.79 1.42 1 13 1162
Age of the respondent (Years) 42.46 16.41 15 79 1162
Major city (0,1) 0.25 0.43 0 1 1162
Living in a block of flats (0,1) 0.13 0.33 0 1 1162
I want to consider myself a responsible person (0, 1, 2, 3) 1.98 1.11 0 3 1088
I want others consider me a responsible person (0, 1, 2, 3) 1.17 1.23 0 3 1086
I perceive recycling as mandatory (0, 1, 2, 3) 1.75 1.21 0 3 1093
I find recycling is a pleasant activity in it-self (0, 1, 2, 3) 1.11 1.14 0 3 1094
I like to do what I want others to do (0, 1, 2, 3) 2.48 0.85 0 3 1092
I want to contribute to the environment (0, 1, 2, 3) 2.82 0.50 0 3 1094
I believe recycling contributes to a better environment (0,1) 0.85 0.36 0 1 1162
It is an advantage if the municipality increases the extent of 
voluntary recycling programs so I can recycle more (0,1) 0.34 0.47 0 1 1162
It as a disadvantage if the municipality increased the extent 
of the voluntary recycling programs (0,1) 0.22 0.42 0 1 1162
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